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Monetary Policy in the 19905
The following is adapted from a speech given by
Robert T. Parry, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Fran-
cisco, on January 14, 1994, to the Los Angeles
chapter ofthe National Association of Business
Economists.
This Letter discusses challenges in conducting
monetary policy in the 1990s-nowthat the mon-
etary aggregates have proved unreliable. The
source of these challenges is financial change-
that is, the sweeping financial deregulation and
innovation that began 20 years ago. As these de-
velopments spread through the financial markets,
they undermined the reliability of the monetary
aggregates. As a result, the aggregates were no
longer reliable indicators of monetary policy.
Moreover, they have been confusing to the pub-
lic who may watch them to figure out the stance
of monetary policy. M1, which used to be our
main indicator, has been soaring for three years.
But the growth ofM2, which replaced M1 as our
prime indicator, has been feeble. And contrary to
either indicator, we've had moderate growth and
well-behaved inflation. My focus will be on how
the Fed has handled policy without reliable ag-
gregates, and on a couple of options under dis-
cussion as indicators or targets-real interest
rates and nominal GOP.
The economic setting in the U.S. and abroad
Not surprisingly, a good deal of attention has
been focused on the rapid real GOP growth in
the latter half of last year, and especially on the
nearly 6 percent growth rate registered in the
fourth quarter. But a longer-term perspective
shows the current expansion so far has been
moderate by postwar standards. Over the 11
quarters since the business cycle trough in early
1991, real GOP has risen at an average annual
rate of 2% percent-well below the 5 percent
average growth rate in previous expansions that
have lasted at least this long.
Why did the economy "creep" out ofthe re-
cession, rather than "boom" back, as it usually
does? Basically because the US., as well as many
ofour major trading partners, are in a stage of
transition-a stage marked by disinflation and
fiscal restraint. In the U.S. defense cuts and other
deficit-reducing measures in the US. are impor-
tant factors that have restrained aggregate de-
mand and slowed economic growth. And for the
last few years, economic activity in our major
trading partners has been lackluster, or worse. In
the other G-7 countries-Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the UK., and Japan-output grew on
average by only 1% percent in 1991, not at all in
1992, and (based on incomplete data) probably
by less than 1 percent last year; Although there
are a variety of special factors operating in indi-
vidual countries, one common reason behind
these developments is policies designed to cut
rates of inflation. All ofthese countries have
made significant progress in reducing inflation
in recent years.
The Fed's role in countering these forces was to
lower interest rates-down to about a third what
they were in 1989. But we lowered them gradu-
ally and cautiously because of our concerns
about inflation. Like many other central banks,
we want to bring inflation down and keep it
close to zero where it will not distort economic
decisionmaking. Thus, in February, we raised the
funds rate by 25 basis points against a back-
ground of a sharp acceleration in the pace of
economic activity and declines in the amount
of slack in labor and product markets.
Although a policy of lowering inflation has its
costs in the short run, I believe it is worth it, be-
cause, in the long run, inflation reduces eco-
nomic well-being (see Motley 1993). For one
thing, inflation often is associated with uncer-
tainty about future inflation, which fosters higher
long-term real interest rates. Uncertainty also
complicates the planning and contracting busi-
nesses do that are so essential to capital forma-
tion, and it drives people to wasteful hedging
activities. Finally, inflation heightens the distor-
tionary effects of our tax system.
Monetary aggregates
Now comes the problem of implementing a low-
inflation policy without relying on the monetary
aggregates. The beauty of the aggregates was that
they helped us solve the "lag problem"-that is,FRBSF
the classic "long and variable lag" between pol-
icy actions and inflation-probably 1V2 to 2
years. The aggregates were easily measured, we
could control them reasonably well in the short
run, and they had a fairly stable relationship to
long-run inflation.
What happened to them? To summarize some 20
years in a single phrase, deregulation and innova-
tion swept through financial markets. Interest rate
ceilings on deposits were eliminated, new sub-
stitutes for deposits in M1 and M2 cropped up,
and shifting funds from one instrument to an-
other got a lot less expensive. Of course, this
innovation and deregulation has been great for
the overall economy: It has brought us more
choices than ever to manage our financial affairs,
and it has made financial markets far more dy-
namic and efficient.
Real interest rates
The real interest rate is appealing because it has
a direct effect on business and household spend-
ing decisions. But italso has problems. Real in-
terest rates are hard to measure because they
depend on unobservable expectations offuture
inflation. And the Fed cannot target real interest
rates beyond the short run because they are de-
termined by market forces. Finally, real interest
rates are meaningful indicators only compared
with a benchmark-an equilibrium real rate-
that would be consistent with full employment.
That equilibrium rate is not directly observable,
and it is difficult to estimate, because it is af-
fected by factors like productivity, government
spending, and income tax rates. So the real inter-
est rate does not appear to be a good candidate
for the Fed's main inflation indicator (Cogley
1993, and Trehan 1993).
But it has created problems for monetary policy.
Growth rates ofMl and M2 no longer give us de-
pendable information about future inflation-
they often just reflect portfolio substitutions. For
example, over the past two years, M2 growth has
slowed dramatically-to an average of only 1V2
percent; if M2 were a reliable indicator of future
inflation, it would imply outright deflation in
1994. With inflation currently a little below 3
percent, that's clearly wide ofthe mark. Why did
M2 growth slow so dramatically? One important
reason is the steep yield curve ofthe last few
years. Households switched outofshort-term,
low-yielding M2 holdings and into long-term,
higher-yielding stock and bond mutua! funds.
But that is not to say that real interest rates are
never useful. If real rates stay very high or very
low, that can be a warning sign. Look atthe
1970s, for instance. Real rates were persistently
negative, and that meant significant inflationary
pressures were building up. More recentlY,in the
past year or so, short-term real rates have been
close to zero (Figure 1). The recent rise in the
funds rate has raised real short-term rates some-
what, but they still are at fairly low levels. Is this
an early warning? Well, I would say this situation
does bear watching.
Figure 1
Real 3-Month T~Bi!1 Rate*

















Now, I do not mean to imply that because we
have lost the aggregates as reliable indicators,
we are helpless. We have always looked at a
number of real and financial variables and have
based our decisions on a good deal of judgment.
And I think we have done fairly well. Real GDP
growth has been respectable, and inflation has
come down. The core inflation rate is now only a
little above 3 percent-better than the 4 to 412
percent rates we saw around the turn of the dec-
ade. And i think we are in a good position to
make further gradual progress on inflation. But I
would certainly be more comfortable about it if
I could look at a reliable leading indicator of in-
flation. Several indicators or targets to replace the
aggregates have been suggested in recent years. I
will focus on two: real interest rates and nominal
income targeting.
*3-Month T-bill rate less CPI inflation over
prior 12 months.Nominal GDP
The second approach uses targets for aggregate
demand, or nominal GOP. Nominal GOP is ap-
pealing as a monetary policy target because its
long-run relationship with inflation is relatively
stable. Furthermore, it will remain stable unless
there's a sudden dramatic change in the trend
growth of real GOP. So it is clearly immune to
the effects of financial change that have under-
mined the monetary aggregates.
The problem with nominal GDP is that it does
not respond to policy actions as quickly as
money did, though the lag is shorter than the in-
flation lag. Some recent research on so-called
"feedback rules" for nominal GOP suggests a
way around this lag problem (McCallum 1990,
Judd and Motley 1993, and Taylor 1993). Feed-
back rules provide "recommendations" for
policy in the short run that are designed to con-
trol nominal GOP-and therefore inflation-in
the long run. The policymaker sets a target for
nominal GOP that is consistent with the inflation
goal. Then, if the latest quarter's actual data are
outside the target, the formula indicates by how
much the funds rate should be raised or lowered.
Consider an example of an inflationary episode
using one version of the rule the staffat the San
Francisco Fed has explored. Suppose the inflation
target is 1 percent. To allow for trend growth in
real GOP of about 3 percent, a nominal GOP
growth target would be set at 3Y2 percent. Now
suppose actual nominal GOP growth in one
quarter comes in at 4Y2 percent. That feedback
rule would call for raising the funds rate by 20
basis points. If nominal GOP continued to ex-
ceed its target, the rule would likewise call for
further increases until nominal GOP hit its target.
So with this approach, policymakers would have
a guide for responding to actual recent data on
aggregate demand and have more confidence
that they would hit their inflation target in the
long run. Of course, this approach is still in
the research stage. And, I personally wouldn't be
comfortable with strictly following any formula.
But I think this approach merits consideration.
The policy recommendations it generates might
be a useful input that provides a benchmark in
making judgmental policy decisions.
Conclusion
This Letter addressed some ofthe issues involved
in conducting monetary policy in the 1990s-a
time of worldwide disinflation, fiscal restraint,
and continuing dynamism in financial markets.
Replacing the monetary aggregates as targets
for policy is not going to be easy. They not only
served as a guide for monetary policymakers, but
they also gave useful signals to everyone else
about the future effects of policy. Even without
useful guidance from the aggregates, though, we
have managed to lower inflation. So let me con-
clude by assuring you that the erosion ofthe ag-
gregates as reliable inflation indicators has not
eroded our commitment to moving gradually to-
ward zero inflation, which I believe is the best
way the Fed can help the U.S. economy achieve
its maximum growth potential.
Robert. T. Parry
President and Chief Executive Officer
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